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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1971, Congress passed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
("ANCSA"),1 granting Alaska Natives 2 title to 40 million acres of land
and nearly a billion dollars in exchange for extinguishing their claims to
Alaskan land.3 ANCSA authorized the creation of two tiers of Native
corporations, regional and village, to receive the settlement offer on be-
half of Alaska Natives. 4 Under ANCSA, each regional and village corpo-
ration was required to incorporate under the laws of Alaska as a business
for profit, and every Alaska Native in each region alive at the time re-
ceived 100 shares of stock.5
Since that time, the thirteen regional Native corporations have be-
come an economic force, employing more than 12,000 employees in
*J.D. Candidate 2005, Seattle University School of Law; B.A. 2000, Dartmouth College. The author
wishes to thank his wife Margaret, the members of the Seattle University Law Review, Professor
Alan Sanders, and his dog McKinley, who selflessly gave up many walks so that the author could
write this article.
1. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629(e)
(2000)).
2. Alaska Natives comprise a number of distinct groups including Aleuts, Alutiiq, Athabas-
cans, Yup'ik, Cup'ik, lnupiaq, the St. Lawrence Island Yup'ik, Eyak, Tlingit, Haida, and Tsimshian.
Information About Alaska Native Cultures, Alaska Native Heritage Center, at http://
www.alaskanative.net/2.asp. (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
3.43 U.S.C. §§ 1611, 1613(h) (2000).
4. §§ 1606, 1607. Although ANCSA is often referred to as a settlement offer, Alaska Natives
could not reject the "offer" because it was a congressionally imposed act.
5. Martha Hirschfield, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: Tribal Sovereignty and the
Corporate Form, 101 YALE L. J. 1331, 1332 (1992).
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Alaska and boasting a portfolio of $2.3 billion in 2003.6 Alaska Native
corporations are in a wide range of businesses, including petroleum ser-
vices, pipeline construction and maintenance, oil drilling, mining and
mining support work, catering and camp services, timber harvesting, and
construction.7 Although many of the corporations have diversified with
assets and employees outside of Alaska, the focus of the Native corpora-
tions remains in Alaska.8
According to the 2000 census, the Alaska Native population
amounted to 98,043 of the total Alaska population of 626,932. 9 The
number of working-age Alaska Natives is much smaller than the total
population of Alaska Natives, with more than forty percent of Alaska
Natives being under the age of eighteen.10 As a result of the proportion-
ally large number of young Alaska Natives, the number of those who
will need employment in the coming decades is likely to increase dra-
matically. 11 Consequently, employment availability and job growth will
prove to be critical issues in the coming decades as the number of Alaska
Natives entering the work force increases.' 2
Currently, most Native corporations offer hiring preferences to
Alaska Natives in some form, either to Native Americans, Alaska Na-
tives, shareholders, or those closely related to shareholders of ANCSA
stock.13 These corporations provide jobs for 3,100 Alaska Natives within
the state and hiring of Alaska Natives is considered to be part of "the
6. THE ASSOC. OF ANCSA REG'L CORPS. PRESIDENTS/ CEOS, NATIVE CORPS.: 2003 ANNUAL
ECON. IMPACT REPORT 13 (2004) (hereinafter 2003 ANNUAL REPORT). An example of the diversi-
fied economic spread of Native corporations is provided by NANA Regional Corp., the Kotzebue-
based regional corporation for northwest Alaska, which boasts a payroll of 1,850 employees. Tim
Bradner, Native Corporations Run Far-Flung Business, ALASKA J. COMMERCE, Aug. 31, 2003,
2003 WL 11771711.
7. Tim Bradner, Native Corporations Play Big Role in Economy, ALASKA J. COMMERCE, Oct.
12, 2003, 2003 WL 11771779.
8. See 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 3.
9. STELLA U. OGUNWOLE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS 2000 BRIEF: THE AMERICAN
INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE POPULATION 5 (Feb. 2000).
10. 2000 Census Redistricting Data, Alaska Dep't of Labor Census 2000, at http://146.63.
75.45/census2000/.
11. The white population of Alaska under age eighteen is approximately twenty-five percent of
the total white population. Id.
12. Id.
13. A survey of Native corporations conducted by the author indicates that AHTNA, Inc.,
Arctic Slope Regional Corp., Bristol Bay Regional Corp., Calista Corp., Chugach Alaska Corp.,
Cook Inlet Region, Inc., Doyon, Ltd., Koniag, Inc., NANA Regional Corp., and Sealaska Corp. all
provide Alaska Native or shareholder hiring preferences. Most regional Native corporations have an
explicit policy of hiring shareholders, which includes shareholders' spouses and descendents. Sev-
eral other Native corporations provide hiring preferences for Alaska Natives in general. One Native
corporation even offers a more general "commitment to shareholder recruitment" policy.
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Native corporations' commitment to welcoming shareholder and Native
participation in company operations and growth.'
' 4
The legal questions arising from the use of hiring preferences by
Native corporations are complex because of the overlapping considera-
tions of federal and state discrimination laws and the Alaska Natives'
need for distinct employment opportunities. The competing goals of
ANCSA-to provide quick settlement of the land claims while remain-
ing in conformity with the real economic and social needs of Natives-
also contribute to the complexity of the legality of hiring preferences.
15
For example, employers are generally prohibited from discriminating in
hiring practices under federal law, 16 but at least with respect to hiring
preferences, Native corporations are exempt from such anti-
discrimination laws. 17 Despite this fact, however, Native corporations are
nonetheless organized under Alaska state law, and as such they are sub-
ject to state corporation laws, unless federal law preempts those laws.' 8
The Alaska Supreme Court recently overruled the legality of a Na-
tive American hiring preference implemented by ordinance in Malabed
v. North Slope Borough.'9 North Slope Borough is a political subdivision
in Alaska.2 ° In 1997, the borough enacted an ordinance that granted an
employment preference to Native Americans, whom it defined as mem-
bers of federally recognized tribes.2' The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
14. 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 15. "The corporations have policies encouraging
the hiring of Alaska Natives, shareholders, and their families." Id.
15. See 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (2000).
16. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to limit, segregate, or clas-
sify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
17. § 2000e(b)(1).
18.43 U.S.C. § 1606(d).
19. See Malabed v. N. Slope Borough, 335 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2003); Malabed v. N. Slope
Borough, 70 P.3d 416, 427-28 (Alaska 2003).
20. Alaska is unique among the fifty states in that most of its land mass is not organized into
political subdivisions because of sparse population in several areas of the state. Local government is
a system of organized boroughs, much like counties in other states, and such boroughs generally
provide more limited services than cities provide. A borough has three mandatory powers: educa-
tion, land use planning, and tax assessment and collection. The major difference between the two
classes is in how they may acquire other powers.
21. NORTH SLOPE BOROUGH, ALASKA, CODE § 2.20.150(A)(27) (1987). As the area's largest
local employer, the borough consulted with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
to determine whether the borough might qualify for an exemption from federal equal employment
opportunity laws. Malabed, 70 P.3d at 418. Specifically, the borough asked about an exemption
under § 703(i) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i) (1994)), which
would exempt hiring preferences favoring Native Americans working on or near Indian reservations
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certified the question of the ordinance's legality to the Alaska Supreme
Court because it was a state law question with no controlling precedent
in previous Alaska Supreme Court decisions. 22 In response, the Alaska
Supreme Court held the following:
The borough's hiring preference violates the Alaska Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection because the borough lacks a legitimate
governmental interest to enact a hiring preference favoring one class
of citizens at the expense of others and because the preference it en-
acted is not closely tailored to meet its goals.23
Thus, the question remaining after Malabed is whether Native cor-
porations can continue to provide employment preferences to Alaska Na-
tives. If they can, the next question is whether such hiring preferences
enacted pursuant to ANCSA are protected by virtue of federal preemp-
tion of Alaska state law regarding hiring preferences.
This Comment argues that Native corporations can provide em-
ployment preferences for Alaska Natives, so long as they are appropri-
ately tailored to provide employment preferences to that corporation's
shareholders or those closely related to the shareholders. Moreover, a
hiring preference based on shareholder status is not a preference based
on race and, as such, does not violate Alaska state law.24 But even if the
Alaska Supreme Court found that these hiring preferences did violate the
state constitution, given the federal government's unique relationship
with Native corporations 25 and Congress's clear intent for Native corpo-
rations to favor Alaska Natives in their hiring practices, federal courts
would likely find that under ANCSA, Congress has preempted Alaska
state law that would disallow hiring preferences for shareholders and
their families. Thus, if properly tailored, Native corporations could use
hiring preferences to meet the needs of shareholders, their spouses, and
their closely related descendants.
from the strictures on discriminatory hiring under Title VII. Id. The commission responded that, in
its view, the 703(i) exemption's reference to "any business or enterprise" extended to the borough,
allowing it to adopt a hiring preference in favor of Native Americans without violating Title VI1's
equal employment opportunity provision, assuming that the borough met the exception's other re-
quirements. Id. After receiving this response, the borough assembly enacted the hiring preference by
an ordinance passed in February 1997; the borough implemented the preference later that year. Id. at
418-19.
22. Malabed, 335 F.3d at 867.
23. Malabed, 70 P.3d at 419, 427-28.
24. The Alaska Constitution provides that "all persons are equal and entitled to equal rights,
opportunities, and protection under the law." ALASKA CONST. art I, § 1.
25. The federal government created the Native corporations to provide the settlement of land
claims, but also created several protections for these corporations, including the inalienability of
stock and exemption from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. See discussion infra Part Ii.
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This Comment is divided into six parts. Part I provides background
about the Alaska Native corporations and their justifications for using
hiring preferences. Next, Part II discusses related federal law issues and
provides background on Native American hiring preferences in the lower
forty-eight states under the Morton v. Mancari decision. Part III ad-
dresses Congress's extension of hiring preferences to Native corpora-
tions. Then, Part IV discusses Alaska constitutional law, Alaska statutes,
and Malabed v. North Slope. Part V draws from the previous discussion
and considers the future of hiring preferences in Native corporations after
Malabed, particularly in the context of Alaska state law, federal preemp-
tion, and permissible forms of hiring preferences. Finally, Part VI con-
cludes by suggesting congressional amendments that might strengthen
Congress's intent to preempt state laws to allow hiring preferences for
Alaska Natives.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Why Native Corporations Need and Use Hiring Preferences
Hiring preferences provide jobs for Alaska Natives within their
communities and contribute to their economic well-being. Although
there is only one Indian reservation in Alaska, 26 the majority of Alaska
27Natives live in rural or semi-rural villages with limited employment.
The high unemployment rate has not changed substantially since the en-
actment of ANCSA in 1971 .28 Mayor Nageak of the North Slope Bor-
ough provided an affidavit for the North Slope litigation showing that, in
contrast to an unemployment rate as high as 25% reported in 1971, the
unemployment rate for Inupiat in 1994 had improved to only 17%.29 Un-
employment rates of 32% to 50% in many Alaska Native villages have
been documented.3 0 Alaska Natives are often dependent on highly vari-
able seasonal work, such as the limited number of jobs available during
the summer construction season. 31 One joint federal-state commission
26. On December 18, 1971, all Alaska Native reservations, with the exception of the Met-
lakatla Reservation in the southernmost part of southeast Alaska, were abolished by the ANCSA. See
DAVID S. CASE & DAVID VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS 65 (2d ed. 2002).
27. Sixty-two percent of Alaska Natives live in rural-village Alaska. 2 FEDERAL AND STATE
COMM'N ON POLICIES AND PROGRAMS AFFECTING ALASKA NATIVES, FINAL REPORT 91 (1994)
(hereinafter ALASKA NATIVES COMM'N REPORT).
28. Brief of Alaska Fed'n of Natives as Amicus Curiae for the Appellant at 3, Malabed v. N.
Slope Borough, 335 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2003) (No. 99-35684).
29. Id. at 4.
30. ALASKA NATIVES COMM'N REPORT, supra note 27, at 91.
31. As a result of the Bureau of Indian Affairs training programs that focus on trade and con-
struction work with the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, Alaska Natives are highly concentrated in the con-
struction trades. ALASKA NATIVES COMM'N REPORT, supra note 27, at 91. Forty-two percent of the
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noted that a primary cause of Native unemployment is the "in-flow to
rural areas of non-residents who take many of the few jobs that are avail-
able.",32 Non-residents have an advantage over Alaska Natives in hiring
because they tend to be better educated, are willing to move away from
their communities to find work, and perhaps most importantly, they are
not likely to be involved in the mix of economies 33 that require Alaska
Natives to forego long-term positions to maintain aspects of their tradi-
tional lifestyles. 34
The mix of economies of Alaska, particularly in Alaskan villages,
35
is substantially different than the economies of the lower forty-eight
states. Alaska Natives often work in two or three economies at the same
time, and the interplay between the modem economy and subsistence
economies is often evident.
Economic development for Fort Yukon is hunting, trapping, and
fishing. We got a project right now at Fort Yukon, the airport pro-
ject ... with all kind[s] of work. Monday morning there was eight
job opening[s]. Not one [of them] was filled, because the kings
36
happened to show up. When September hunting comels] around,
you're not going to find anybody work in Fort Yukon, because this
is their economic development you're talking about, their liveli-
hood.37
In light of these mixed economies, in order to promote Alaska Na-
tive employment, jobs must be structured to accommodate this depend-
ence on subsistence.3 8 Even when jobs are available, and Alaska Natives
have the skills to fill them, most employers have not shaped the jobs to
account for the differing life and work patterns of Alaska Natives.
39
approximately 16,000 Alaska Native men in the state's civilian labor force work in a trade or con-
struction-related field. Id. at 92.
32. Id. at 97.
33. The "mix of economies" refers to the combination of the subsistence economies (hunting,
fishing, and gathering) with the modem economy.
34. In contrast to the Alaska statewide average of 87%, only 63% of the 41,949 Alaska Natives
over twenty-five years old had received a high school diploma in 1990. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
WE THE FIRST AMERICANS 15 (Sept. 1993), available at http://www.census.gov/aps d/wepeople/
we5.pdf.
35. "Village Alaska" refers to the small Native villages located throughout the state.
36. "Kings" refers to a king salmon run on the Yukon River.
37. ALASKA NATIVES COMM'N REPORT, supra note 27, at 88 (quoting Jonathan Solomon,
Second Chief of the Fort Yukon Tribal Council). Although there are commercial salmon fisheries on
the Yukon River, the salmon fishing discussed in this excerpt refers to subsistence harvests by
Alaska Natives.
38. See id. at 88.
39. Id. at 97.
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Former executive vice-president of NANA Corporation, Inc.,4 ° John
Shively, expressed similar concerns as he discussed NANA Corpora-
tion's experiences with the Red Dog Mine: 41
One of the places that we have not succeeded, we've tried with
Cominco, is the idea that they should stop looking to individual
workers' careers. I mean, some people will do that, but they should
be more flexible in terms of offering people [jobs] that maybe only
want to work their operations six months of the year, or developing
a big cadre of people, let's say millwrights, they know that they've
got 60 or 70 in the region, and they just run people in and out, be-
cause . . . people aren't, in our region, into wealth accumulation,
which is the basis for western economy. They're ... into other cul-
tural activities; and it's a strength that has never been used, to my
knowledge, very well in this state in any sort of ongoing business
that can keep a broader work force working. Actually, money from
projects like Red Dog, I think, goes much farther in the Native
community than it would in the non-Native community, because it
doesn't go to the people that earn it, it goes to their immediate and
extended family.4
The ability of Native corporations to offer hiring preferences to
Alaska Natives is critical to federal Indian policy toward Alaska Natives
because of (1) the unique position of Native corporations; (2) the dimin-
ished role that tribes play in the economic lives of Alaska Natives; and
(3) the underlying purposes of ANCSA.
First, because the Native corporation leaders are drawn from the
shareholder population, these corporations are uniquely able to structure
jobs in a manner that is compatible with the subsistence needs of their
shareholders and other village residents.4 3 Alaska Natives have lived a
subsistence lifestyle 44 for thousands of years-a lifestyle that for many
continues to contribute to a substantial part of their protein-rich diets.45
40. NANA Regional Corp. was formed as a result of the ANCSA and is based in Kotzebue, on
the western coast of Alaska.
41. Red Dog Mine is owned by NANA Regional Corp., but is operated by Teck Cominco, Ltd.,
a large Canadian mining company.
42. ALASKA NATIVES COMM'N REPORT, supra note 27, at 88.
43. The leaders of a Native corporation are thus more acutely aware of the elements of its
employees' traditional lifestyles because these individuals are drawn from the Native population.
44. Subsistence includes the customary and traditional uses of fish and game in all of Alaska's
rural areas. Therefore, if a person moves into a rural area and adopts that way of living for his own,
that person, whether Alaska Native or non-native, may legally fish and hunt for subsistence. Robert
Wolfe, Alaska Dep 't ofFish and Game Frequently Asked Questions: Myths, What Have You Heard?
at http://www.subsistence.adfg.state.ak.us/geninfo/about/subfaq.cfm#ql (last modified Nov. 11,
2003).
45. After 15 years of study, the Alaska Dep't of Fish and Game found that in forty-five of the
ninety-eight Alaska communities surveyed in the 1980s, subsistence harvests equaled or surpassed
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Native corporation leaders can more effectively structure employment
that takes subsistence into account because many are keenly aware of the
needs of the shareholders in their regions and often participate in the sub-
sistence activities themselves. Limiting the Native corporations' ability
to use hiring preferences for Alaska Natives could substantially limit op-
portunities that accommodate the subsistence lifestyle needs of Alaska
villages.
The importance of subsistence hunting and fishing to Alaska Na-
tives cannot be overstated. An Alaska government report concluded that"whatever the reasons for difficulty in translating short-term government
monies into long-term jobs in villages, one consequence of high and in-
creasing levels of unemployment is that subsistence activities, which
have always been of great importance to the villages, will grow in abso-
lute and relative importance.4
Second, Native corporations must be allowed to engage in preferen-
tial hiring because ANCSA diminished the role that tribes play in the
economic lives of Alaska Natives, particularly in the area of employment
support. Alaska Native "tribes" are exempt from enforcement of federal
and state employment discrimination claims because (1) they are not
state-recognized entities; (2) they are specifically exempted from the
definition of "employer" under Section 701(b)(1) of the Civil Rights
Act;47 and (3) as federally recognized tribes, they are immune from
suit.48 However, the economic resources of Alaska Natives are not found
in the tribes, but rather in the Native corporations. 49 Because it was the
Native corporations that received all the land and money from the set-
tlement, while tribal entities essentially received nothing,5 ° Native corpo-
rations are uniquely capable of filling the void left in Alaska Natives'
economic lives.
Another factor that has limited the power of tribes to provide em-
ployment support for Alaska Natives is the decision in Alaska v. Native
Village of Venetie Tribal Government.51 In Venetie, Alaska brought suit
challenging the Native Village of Venetie's authority to tax a state-
the quantity of western U.S. standard for average annual capita purchases of meat, fish, and poultry.
ALASKA NATIVES COMM'N REPORT, supra note 27, at 98.
46. D. MITCHELL, ALASKA DEP'T OF COMMERCE AND ECON. DEV., THE ALASKA ECONOMY:
PERFORMANCE REPORT 3 (1988).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(l) (2000).
48. See CASE, supra note 26, at 402.
49. Both the 44 million acres of land retained by Alaska Natives and the nearly $1 billion
granted to Native people are controlled by Native boards of directors of Native corporations, who
also have complete control over their corporate assets. 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 7.
50.43 U.S.C. § 1605(c) (2000).
51. 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
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funded construction project.52 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals con-
cluded that because a tribe exercises its sovereign authority to tax non-
members only within the confines of tribal territory, a tax is valid only
over nonmembers within the confines of "Indian Country."5 3 The case
was remanded to the district court for factual determinations and then,
before making its way back to the court of appeals, was consolidated
with several other cases to address the question of what constitutes "In-
dian Country." 54 Although the court of appeals upheld the Native corpo-
ration lands as "Indian Country," the United States Supreme Court over-
turned the decision in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Thomas.
He concluded that after the enactment of ANCSA, the Village of Venetie
lands did not meet the qualifications 55 for "Indian Country., 56 After Ve-
netie, Alaska Native tribes essentially have no land over which to exer-
cise sovereignty, with the possible exception of non-ANCSA lands such
as allotments and town sites.5 7 Without this sovereignty, the Native vil-
lages cannot exercise taxing powers over the lands that they possess.
58
Without tax income from nonmembers, the tribes have substantially less
income to provide economic opportunities for their members than they
would otherwise.
Finally, although ANCSA's stated purpose was to settle Alaska
land claims "rapidly" and "with certainty," the settlement also intended
to accomplish those goals "in conformity with the real economic and so-
cial needs of Natives., 59 Allowing Native corporations to use Alaska Na-
tive hiring preferences conforms to ANCSA's goals by taking into ac-
count the economic and social needs of Alaska Natives. Alaska Natives
may not have a uniform need for hiring preferences, but taking away this
option from Native corporations forecloses one of the benefits that Na-
tive corporations can and should be able to provide to Alaska Natives.
52. Id. at 525.
53. Alaska v. Native Viii. of Venetie, 856 F.2d 1384, 1390 (9th Cir. 1988).
54. Alaska v. Native Viii. of Venetie, 101 F.3d 1286 (9th Cir. 1996); see also CASE, supra note
26, at 424-27. "Indian Country" refers to a limited category of Native lands that are neither reserva-
tions nor allotments, and that satisfy two requirements: first, they must have been set aside by federal
government for use of the Indians as Native land; second, they must be under federal superinten-
dence. See Venetie, 522 U.S. at 527.
55. Relying on 18 U.S.C. § 1151, the Court concluded that a federal set-aside and a federal
superintendence requirement must be satisfied for a finding of a "dependent Indian community"
(Indian Country). The Court also noted that "after the enactment of ANCSA, the Tribe's lands are
neither validly set apart for the use of Indians as such, nor are they under the superintendence of the
Federal Government." Venetie, 522 U.S. at 531-32.
56. Id. at 527.
57. See id.
58. See CASE, supra note 26, at 424-27.
59.43 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (2000).
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B. The Form of Hiring Preferences
A hiring preference for Alaska Natives can be structured in a vari-
ety of ways. Hiring preferences constitute a continuum stretching from
the narrowest preference-a shareholder-only hiring preference-to the
broadest-a hiring preference for any Native American with a tribal
status that is recognized by the federal government. A Native corporation
can structure its hiring preferences along this continuum to be more in-
clusive or exclusive.
First, Native corporations could implement the narrowest hiring
preference, a preference offered only to shareholders of the hiring corpo-
ration. Second, Native corporations could offer a slightly broader prefer-
ence based on shareholder, shareholder-spouse, or shareholder-
descendant status for the specific Native corporation in which the appli-
cant, or his close family member, is a shareholder. Third, Native corpora-
tions could offer an even broader hiring preference to any shareholder,
spouse, or descendant of a shareholder from any Alaska Native corpora-
tion, not just the specific corporation in which the individual or his or her
relative owns stock. 60 Fourth, Native corporations could offer an even
broader preference to any Alaska residents recognized as Alaska Natives
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 61 Finally, the Native corporations could
offer the most inclusive hiring preference by offering it to any Native
American. 62 The hiring preference struck down in Malabed was the lat-
ter, offering an employment preference-including hiring, promotions,
transfers, and reinstatements-for any Native American applicant.63
The narrowest preference, the shareholder-only preference, would
be far too narrow to accomplish Congress's goals of encouraging Native
corporations to use hiring preferences. 64 The shareholder-only preference
would exclude those members of Alaska Native villages who were born
60. This would essentially be the same as a hiring preference for any Alaska Native because
anyone who is an Alaska Native is likely to be a spouse or descendant of a shareholder of one of the
Alaska Native corporations.
61. The 1993 Department of the Interior Federally Recognized Tribes List included 227 Alaska
tribes. Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List, 58 Fed. Reg. 54,364, 54,368 (Oct. 21, 1993) (codi-
fied at 25 U.S.C. § 479(a) (2000)). Those Alaska Natives who are registered with the Bureau of
Indian Affairs as members of these tribes would qualify for the hiring preference.
62. This classification would refer to a Native American registered with any tribe recognized
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
63. Malabed v. N. Slope Borough, 70 P.3d 416, 418 (Alaska 2003). This list does not address
the internal hiring policies of the Native corporations or the implementation of such hiring prefer-
ences, which could vary substantially even within the same category.
64. Congress has indicated a strong interest in allowing Native Alaskan hiring preferences by
Native corporations by amending ANCSA several times.
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after 1971 .65 In addition, many shareholders alive during the initial con-
veyance of shares in 1971 are likely to exit the work force as they age.
Thus, a broader preference that provides a benefit to a wider cross sec-
tion of Alaska Natives is preferable because it would extend preferences
to those who have not yet entered the work force and do not have share-
holder status because they were born after 1971.
Based on the current hiring preferences offered, Native corporations
also seem to disfavor the narrow shareholder-only preference. 66 For ex-
ample, NANA Corporation, AHTNA Corporation, and Cook Inlet 67 all
have shareholder hiring preferences that include advantages for spouses
and descendents of shareholders.68 Calista Corporation69 "maintains a
hiring preference for Alaska Natives and American Indians, in gen-
eral."70 Calista Corporation's employment application also incorporates
preferences in its hiring because it asks applicants whether they are Cal-
ista shareholders, spouses of Calista shareholders, descendents of Calista
shareholders, shareholders of another region, or members of a Native
American tribe.71 Only one of the thirteen regional Native corporations
indicates a narrow preference in its "commitment to hiring sharehold-
ers."72
Even if a Native corporation adopts a "commitment to hiring share-
holders" policy, it does not necessarily exclude broader hiring prefer-
ences because this policy traditionally suggests only a focus on share-
holder hiring. Throughout the remainder of this Comment, the following
two hiring preferences will be considered: (1) hiring preferences for
65. Only Alaska Natives who were alive in 1971 received original shares from the regional
corporations. Although some regional Native corporations have extended shareholder status to its
younger members, many Alaska Natives will not receive shares until shares pass through sharehold-
ers' estates. CASE, supra note 26, at 159-60.
66. The survey discussed in note 13 indicates that most Native corporations use a wider prefer-
ence than a "shareholders only" preference. See supra note 13.
67. NANA Regional Corp. is on the western Alaska coast; AHTNA Corp. is located in the
Copper River region; and Cook Inlet is in south-central Alaska.
68. NANA Corp. Employment Application, at http://www.nana.com/jobs.htm (last visited
Nov. 12, 2004); AHTNA Employment Application, at http://www.ahtna-inc.com/pdf/
Job%20Application.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004); Cook Inlet Region, Inc., Job Postings, at
http://www.ciri.com/jobs/jobs.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
69. Calista Corp. is the second largest of the thirteen regional corporations formed under
ANCSA. The Calista land entitlement is located in two major river deltas, the Yukon and Kuskok-
wim, and comprises fifty-six villages and approximately 20,000 people. Calista Corp., Calista Cor-
porate Profile, at http://www.calistacorp.com/profile.html (last modified Dec. 11, 2003).
70. Calista Corp., Native Preference and Employment Policy, at http://www.calistacorp.com/
employment8.html (last modified Dec. 11, 2003).
71. Calista Corp., Application for Employment, at http://www.calistacorp.com/empdfs/
application.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
72. See Sealaska Corp., Hire Policy, at http://www.sealaska.com/opportunities hiring.htm (last
visited Nov. 12, 2004).
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shareholders and individuals related to shareholders and (2) hiring pref-
erences for Alaska Natives as defined by the federal government.
III. HIRING PREFERENCES AND ISSUES OF FEDERAL LAW
A. Federal Hiring Preferences for Native Americans
The 150-year history of Native American employment preferences
makes hiring preferences a critical part of federal Indian policy. 73 Native
American employment and contracting preferences have also developed
considerably in the second half of the twentieth century. 4 In fact, three
key Indian employment preferences are codified in the United States
Code: 75 Section 12 of the Indian Reorganization Act76 offers a Bureau of
Indian Affairs employment preference; section 7(b) of the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act77 provides employment and
contracting preferences related to federal contracts "benefiting" Indians;
and Title VII, section 703(i) of the Civil Rights Act of 196478 adopts em-
ployment preferences as a policy of "any business or enterprise on or
near an Indian reservation." The first two preferences apply only to fed-
eral jobs and federal contracts. The third preference is a broader provi-
sion that allows any business "on or near an Indian reservation" to enact
a hiring preference without violating federal civil rights legislation.79
This final preference is also applicable to Native corporations because it
specifically identifies them as groups that may enact hiring preferences.80
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, also referred to as the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act, broadly seeks to eliminate and remedy dis-
crimination in the workforce by banning employment discrimination
based on race, gender, religion, and political differences.81 By excluding
businesses "on or near ... reservations" from the Act, Congress has im-
pliedly expressed the goal of promoting reservation economies by stimu-
lating employment for Native Americans, both on the reservation and
off.82 Such an enactment is effective, at least within the reservations, be-
73. See W. CANBY, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 336-37, 364-65 (4th ed. 2003).
74. CASE, supra note 26, at 249.
75. Id.
76. 25 U.S.C. § 472 (2000).
77. Id. § 458(e)(b).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i) (2000).
79. Mitchell Peterson, The Applicability of Federal Employment Law to Indian Tribes, 47 S.D.
L. Rev. 631, 640 (2002) (citing § 2000e-2(i)).
80. § 2000e(b).
81. § 2000e-2(a).
82. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 545-46 (1974) (noting that the unique status of Indians
and the need to promote employment on reservations were motivating factors behind 42 U. S.C. §
2000(e)-2(i)).
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cause tribal sovereignty over the reservation precludes state jurisdiction
over the businesses. 83 States have jurisdiction only for the limited pur-
poses of collecting taxes from nonmembers.8 4 Non-reservation lands
could arguably fall under state jurisdiction and therefore could be subject
to state discrimination laws. However, this question remains untested in
the courts.
Despite the courts' mixed treatment of business entities related to
tribal interests on non-reservation lands, Native American tribes in the
lower forty-eight states have a distinct advantage over the Alaska Natives
in implementing hiring preferences because tribes in the lower forty-
eight states have sovereignty over their reservations.85 As discussed
above, after Venetie, Alaska Native tribes and villages do not have sov-
ereignty over lands granted to the Native corporations because the Court
held that ANCSA land was not "Indian Country" for the purposes of
sovereignty. 86 By removing ANCSA land from "Indian Country," Alaska
Native tribes and villages became "sovereigns without territorial reach."
87 Hence, despite being recognized as tribes by the United States gov-
ernment, Alaska Native tribes do not have sovereignty over lands that
would enable them to enact hiring preferences completely without state
intervention being aroused.
B. Federal Indian Preference Decisions
Federal courts have upheld the legitimacy of federal governmental
hiring practices that favor Native Americans. For example, the United
States Supreme Court upheld the Indian Reorganization Act employment
preference18 at issue in Morton v. Mancari by deeming the preference to
be based on the unique political status of Native Americans as members
83. See Vicky Limas, Employment Suits Against Indian Tribes: Balancing Sovereign Rights
and Civil Rights, 70 DENV. U. L. REV. 359, 385 (1993).
84. In Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenay Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S.
463 (1976), the Court held that the state can require Indian tribes to collect tax on sales of tobacco
products to nonmembers. In the most recent case addressing this issue, Oklahoma Tax Commission
v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (199 1), the Court reached the same conclu-
sion, reasoning that the state's interest in collecting taxes justified the minimal burden imposed on
the tribe in collecting the tax and did not violate the tribe's sovereignty.
85. There are 314 recognized reservations in the United States. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
supra note 34, at 7.
86. Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520, 531 (1998); Alaska v. Native Vill. of Ve-
netie, 101 F.3d 1286, 1297 (9th Cir. 1996). (finding that ANCSA effected "a significant diminution
of the power of Congress and the executive agencies over Alaska Native tribes, suggesting a shift
from government superintendence to self-regulation.").
87. CASE, supra note 26, at 424-27; see also Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1303.
88. The Indian Preference Act provides a preference for "qualified Indians" for appointment to
vacancies for positions in the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 25 U.S.C. § 472 (2000).
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of Indian Tribes, and not based on race.89 In dismissing the notion that
the hiring preference was a racial preference, the Court stated that "it is
an employment criterion reasonably designed to further the cause of In-
dian self-government." 90
Since Morton v. Mancari, the federal courts of appeal have con-
cluded that employment preferences are a viable part of federal Indian
policy. The Ninth Circuit has upheld both Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act 9' employment and contracting preferences in
Alaska.92 In Preston v. Heckler, the court noted that "Congress [clearly]
considers Indian [hiring] preferences to be an important element of fed-
eral Indian Policy. '93 Also, in Livingston v. Ewing, a Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals upheld the practice of allowing only Native Americans to
display and sell handcrafted jewelry in the city square. 94 The court justi-
fied the discriminatory treatment by finding that furthering of the pub-
lic's education of Indian culture was a legitimate governmental interest. 95
In upholding the preference, the court cited Morton v. Mancari to sup-
port its own holding that the Title VII exception also applies to non-
reservation lands near reservations.96
The principles set forth in Morton v. Mancari remain important to
present cases. The Supreme Court has, in fact, recently upheld the con-
tinued viability of Morton v. Mancari. In Rice v. Cayetano, a case in-
volving the status of Hawaiian Natives, Justice Kennedy distinguished
the status of Hawaiians from American Indians, reiterating that the Man-
cari doctrine applied only to "federally recognized tribes. 97 With regard
to Alaska Natives, although their tribes and villages are federally recog-
nized tribes, they do not have their own governmental territory, but have
instead been given Native corporations under ANCSA. Under ANCSA,
the federal government has conferred benefits upon Native corporations
through the provision of stock restrictions, tax exemptions, creditor pro-
tections for undeveloped lands, and by using hiring preferences similar to
89. 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974).
90. Id. at 554 n.24.
91. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. Section 7(b) of the Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act provides employment and contracting preference related to federal
contracts "benefiting" Indians.
92. See Preston v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1984) (employment preference); Alaska
General Contractors v. AVCP Hous. Auth., 694 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982) (contracting preference).
93. Preston, 734 F.2d at 1370.
94. Livingston v. Ewing, 601 F.2d 1110 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979).
95. Id. at 1115-16.
96. Id. at 1113-14.
97. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 518 (2000).
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those offered to Native Americans in the lower forty-eight states "on or
near reservations.
98
IV. NATIVE CORPORATIONS AS AN EXTENSION OF THE FEDERAL
INDIAN POLICY FOR HIRING PREFERENCES
Despite the statement in ANCSA disfavoring the creation of long-
term "racially99 defined institutions,"'0 0 Congress expressed a clear intent
to continue the policy recognizing Native corporations as unique entities
and allowing Native corporations to provide hiring preferences for
Alaska Natives. These intentions are manifested by several ANCSA
amendments: (1) the indefinite extension of the inalienability of the
shares;1 °1 (2) the express exclusion of the Native corporations from the
Civil Rights Act for the specific purpose of allowing hiring prefer-
ences; 102 and (3) the express authority of Native corporations to provide
benefits to its shareholders.10
3
First, Congress's extension of the inalienability of shares indicates
that Congress abandoned the goal of completely integrating Native cor-
porations into the marketplace. Unlike the prior United States aboriginal
claim settlements in the lower forty-eight states, the lands and assets
conveyed to Natives under ANCSA were not initially held in trust or
other form of permanent protection.10 4 Instead, they were conveyed to
state-chartered business corporations'0 5 and were subject to the sole re-
98. See CASE, supra note 26, at 168-70.
99. Section 1601 of ANCSA predates the 1993 Department of Interior Federally Recognized
Indian Tribe List. With the congressional ratification of the list in 1994, Alaska Natives gained the
same recognized political status as Native Americans in the lower forty-eight states and, therefore,
the "racially defined" language of § 1601(b) may no longer be strictly applicable. See Federally
Recognized Indian Tribe List, 58 Fed. Reg. 54,364, 54,368 (Oct. 21, 1993) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §
479(a) (2000)).
100. Congress directed that:
The settlement should be accomplished rapidly, with certainty, in conformity with the
real economic and social needs of Natives, without litigation, with maximum participa-
tion by Natives in decisions affecting their rights and property, without establishing any
permanent racially defined institutions, rights, privileges, or obligations, without creating
a reservation system or lengthy wardship or trusteeship, and without adding to the catego-
ries of property and institutions enjoying special tax privileges or to the legislation estab-
lishing special relationships between the United States Government and the State of
Alaska.
43 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (2000).
101. Pub. L. No. 100-241, § 11, 101 Stat. 1788, 1806 (1988) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.
§ 1636 (2000)).
102.42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(l).
103.43 U.S.C. § 1606(r).
104. Id. § 1601; see also CASE, supra note 26, at 159.
105. The Native corporations were formed primarily as a means of receiving federal benefits
on behalf of Alaska Natives.
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striction that stock would be inalienable for a period of twenty years. °6
However, in 1987, Congress amended ANCSA10 7 to provide permanent
inalienability for the ANCSA stock, unless the shareholders of individual
ANCSA corporations allowed otherwise. 0 8 The recognition of the long-
term inalienability under these amendments effectively ended the poten-
tial for Native corporations to become fully integrated corporations under
Alaska law because the amendments no longer set any timeframe for the
inalienability to end.10 9
Second, Congress formally excluded Native corporations from the
Civil Rights Act." 0 Specifically, an amendment to ANCSA exempted
Alaska Native corporations from the definition of "employer" under sec-
tion 701 (b)(1) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act."' Based on this amendment,
a Native corporation, like businesses "on or near reservations" in the
continental United States, is excluded from the definition of "employer"
and could therefore discriminate based on "race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin" without violating federal law." 2 However, the primary
purpose of the amendment was to allow Alaska Native hiring prefer-
ences.1 3 The legislative history of the provision indicates that the ex-
emption is intended to "facilitate Alaska Native shareholder employment
programs by resolving any uncertainty as to the applicability of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to certain business enterprises in which Native corpo-
rations participate."' 14
Finally, section 1606(r) of ANCSA has explicit language allowing
Native corporations to provide benefits to their shareholders and imme-
diate family members." 15
The authority of a Native Corporation to provide benefits to its
shareholders who are Natives or descendants of Natives or to its
shareholders' immediate family members who are Natives or de-
106. § 1606(h)(1)(B).
107. CASE, supra note 26, at 173.
108. § 1636.
109. See id.
110.43 U.S.C. § 1626(g) (2002).
111.42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(1) (2000). Section 1626(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides
the following:
For the purposes of implementation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000a et
seq.), a Native Corporation and corporations, partnerships, joint ventures, trusts, or affili-
ates in which the Native Corporation owns not less than 25 per centum of the equity shall
be within the class of entities excluded from the definition of "employer" by section
701(b)(1) of Public Law 88-352 (78 Stat. 253), as amended (42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(l)), or
successor statutes).
112. CASE, supra note 26, at 250.
113. See S. REP. No. 100-201 at 26 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3269, 3290.
114. See id.
115.43 U.S.C. § 1606(r).
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scendants of Natives to promote the health, education, or welfare of
such shareholders or family members is expressly authorized and
confirmed. Eligibility for such benefits need not be based on share
ownership in the Native Corporation and such benefits may be 6pro-vided on a basis other than pro rata based on share ownership.
In essence, a hiring preference can be read as a benefit that provides
for the welfare of "such shareholders or family members" as defined in
this section. As discussed below, unlike the Civil Rights Act exemption
for Native corporations, section 1606(r) includes explicit preemption
language." 7
V. MLABED V. NORTH SLOPE BOROUGH
In 1997, the North Slope Borough, a political subdivision of the
Alaska, enacted an ordinance granting employment preferences to "Na-
tive Americans," defined as members of federally recognized tribes." 8
Three non-Native Americans, Robert Malabed, Morris David Welch, and
Charles Michael Emerson, applied for jobs or promotions with the North
Slope Borough and were rejected in favor of Alaska Natives." 19 Malabed,
Welch, and Emerson sued the North Slope Borough, contending that the
borough rejected their applications for less qualified Native Americans
based upon the ordinance.' 20 They argued that the ordinance impermissi-
bly discriminated on the basis of race, national origin, and political af-
filiation in violation of several state and local laws, including the Alaska
Constitution's Equal Protection Clause, Alaska's statutory scheme,' 21
and the borough's charter. 22
Although the parties originally filed Malabed in federal court,' 23 the
case was actually decided under the Alaska Constitution's Equal Protec-
tion Clause after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals directed the Alaska
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. Malabed v. N. Slope Borough, 70 P.3d 416, 416,427-28 (Alaska 2003).
119. Malabed v. N. Slope Borough, 42 F. Supp. 2d 927, 929 (D. Alaska 1999).
120. Malabed, 70 P.3d at 419.
121. ALASKA STAT. § 29.20.630 (2002) specifically prohibits Alaska's municipalities like the
North Slope Borough from engaging in racial and national origin discrimination.
122. At the time of litigation, the North Slope Borough Code stated:
The granting of employment preference to Native Americans. The preference shall apply
to hirings, promotions, transfers, and reinstatements. A Native American applicant who
meets the minimum qualifications for a position, the best qualified among these shall be
selected. A Native American is [a] person belonging to an Indian tribe as defined in 25
U.S.C. § 3703(10).
NORTH SLOPE BOROUGH MUNICIPAL CODE § 2.20.150(A)(27).
123. Malabed, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 927.
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Supreme Court to interpret its own constitution. 124 The case returned to
the circuit court for the final dispensation on the question of federal pre-
125emption.
A. The Violation of the Alaska Constitution
The Alaska Constitution guarantees that "all persons are equal and
entitled to equal rights, opportunities, and protection under the law" and
that "no person is to be denied the enjoyment of any civil or political
right because of race, color, creed, sex, or national origin."' 126 Accord-
ingly, the Alaska Supreme Court analyzes equal protection claims using
a three-step, sliding scale equal protection test:
To implement Alaska's more stringent equal protection standard,
we adopted a three-step, sliding scale test that places a progressively
greater or lesser burden on the state, depending on the importance
of the individual right affected by the disputed classification and the
nature of the governmental interests at stake: [F]irst, we deter-
mine the weight of the individual interest impaired by the classi-
fication; second, we examine the importance of the purposes under-
lying the government's action; and third, we evaluate the means
employed to further those goals to determine the closeness of the
means-to-end fit. 127
The Alaska Supreme Court, in answering the certification from the
circuit court, held that "the Borough's hiring preference violate[d] the
Alaska Constitution's guarantee of equal protection because the Borough
lack[ed] a legitimate governmental interest to enact a hiring preference
favoring one class of citizens at the expense of others and because the
preference it enacted [was] not closely tailored to meet its goals." 28 The
court applied its three-step equal protection standard to reach this conclu-
129sion.
The court addressed the first step of the equal protection standard to
determine if the weight of the individual interest was impaired by the
classification. 130 The court concluded that because the borough's hiring
preference impaired Mr. Malabed's right to seek and obtain employment
in his profession, an important right had been violated.' 31
124. Malabed v. N. Slope Borough, 335 F.3d 864, 866 (9th Cir. 2003).
125. See id. at 868.
126. ALASKA CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 3.
127. Malabed, 70 P.3d at 420-21.
128. Id. at 427-28.
129. Id. at 420.
130. Id. at 421.
131. Id.
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In the second step, the court examined the importance of the pur-
poses of the government's action. 132 The court cited the following rea-
sons for its conclusion that the borough had no legitimate interest in cre-
ating a hiring preference that favored one class of Alaskans over an-
other: 133 (1) "[T]he Alaska Constitution [did] not give the Borough a le-
gitimate interest in adopting the preference" because the Alaska Consti-
tution did not radiate the "implied guardianship powers allowing the state
or its boroughs to treat Alaska Natives as if they were wards;"' 34 (2) the
state law, Alaska Statutes section 29.20.630, referred to as the "Prohib-
ited Discrimination Statute," specifically prohibited Alaska's municipali-
ties from engaging in racial and national origin discrimination;' 35 (3) the
borough's charter prohibited these forms of discrimination;' 36(4) the or-
dinance was actually intended to benefit Inupiat Eskimos and was thus a
classification based on race; 37 and (5) the Civil Rights Act exemption
for Native corporations was too attenuated from the borough ordinance
to justify its application in the present case. 1
38
Finally, although the court could have ended its analysis by finding
no legitimate state interest, it also addressed the means-to-end fit. 139 The
court noted that the ordinance did not meet the means-to-end fit require-
ment because the ordinance was "stunningly broad" in light of its pur-
pose of reducing Native American unemployment. 140 The court reasoned
that the ordinance extended borough-wide and to all aspects of employ-
ment, was limitless in duration, covered all aspects of promotions, trans-
fers and reinstatements, and applied absolutely to allow those without
minimum qualification to be hired over a non-Native applicant who was
qualified. 141
Despite the apparent failure of the ordinance under the three-step
equal protection analysis, the court explicitly limited its holding:
We by no means suggest that boroughs are categorically barred
from adopting hiring preferences. Nor do we suggest that all state or
local legislation pertaining to Alaska Natives or tribal governments
should be assumed to establish suspect classifications presumptively
132. Id. at 420.
133. Id. at 421-22.
134. Id. at 422.
135. ALASKA STAT. § 29.20.630 (2002).
136. "No person may be discriminated against in any borough employment because of race,
age, color, political, or religious affiliation, or national origin." NORTH SLOPE BOROUGH CHARTER §
16.020 (1997).
137. Malabed, 70 P.3d at 424.
138. See id.
139. Id. at 427.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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barred by equal protection. Our focus is considerably narrower:
[W]e simply hold, in keeping with Enserch,142 that the borough has
no legitimate basis to claim a general governmental interest in en-
acting hiring preferences favoring one class of citizens over others;
and we find that the borough has failed to identify any source of a
legitimate, case-specific governmental interest in the preference it
actually, adopted-a hiring preference favoring Native Ameri-
cans.
By limiting its holding to the facts before the court, the Alaska Su-
preme Court indicated that hiring preferences may not necessarily violate
state law.
The court further stated that "[a]ssuming for present purposes that
the borough's ordinance reflect[ed] this kind of political classification
and [did] not discriminate on the basis of race, the ordinance might
[have] avoid[ed] problems with the Alaska Constitution's bar against
racial discrimination."'' 44 This language indicates that although Alaska
may not recognize political classification of Alaska Natives, such recog-
nition under federal law does not necessarily trigger a finding of racial
discrimination under Alaska's Prohibited Discrimination Statute. 45 Thus,
Alaska Native corporations, being federally recognized entities, may
classify Alaska Natives and yet not run afoul of the Prohibited Discrimi-
nation Statute.
Finally, in differentiating Malabed from Morton v. Mancari, the
court focused on the notion that the borough, unlike the Bureau of Indian
Affairs in Morton v. Mancari, 146 had no governmental interest in further-
ing Native American self-government. i47 The court also concluded that
in contrast to the federal law at issue in Mancari, Native Americans had
no explicitly "unique legal status" under borough law. 48 The fact that the
Borough was a recognized entity of Alaska state government essentially
was the dispositive factor in this case. 1
4 9
142. In State Departments of Transportation & Labor v. Enserch Alaska Construction, Inc.,
787 P.2d 624 (Alaska 1989), the court struck down an Alaska statute that provided hiring prefer-
ences for public works projects to residents of economically distressed zones. The Court applied the
same three-step analysis and deemed that favoring one class of citizens over another violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Alaska Constitution.
143. Malabed, 79 P.3d at 426.
144. Id. at 420.
145. See id.
146. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 545-46 (1974).
147. Malabed, 70 P.3d at 420.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 426-27.
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B. Why Alaska State Law Was Not Preempted
in Malabed v. North Slope
Upon receiving the Alaska Supreme Court's ruling on the state law
issues in Malabed, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that
Congress did not expressly preempt Alaska state law' 50 or occupy the
field. 15 The court also deemed that section 703(i) Civil Rights Act 52 did
not conflict with state law because Congress only intended to limit the
scope of section 703(i) as to otherwise valid Native American preference
programs.153
The circuit court began with the presumption that Congress did not
intend to preempt state law.' 54 In determining whether a federal statute
preempts state law, the court stated that its "sole task is to ascertain the
intent of Congress."' 55 The court concluded that "there can be no valid
argument that Congress has preempted state law here by express state-
ment or by "occupying the field" because Congress did not "recite an
intent to preempt state laws forbidding discrimination nor has it occupied
the field in a way that prohibits states from outlawing discrimination."'' 56
Thus, the court narrowed its discussion to whether section 703(i) of the
Civil Rights Act conflicted with state discrimination laws and therefore
preempted such laws. 157
Dismissing the borough's contention that section 703(i) is inconsis-
tent with state laws prohibiting the borough from giving hiring prefer-
ences and are therefore preempted, the court asserted that the plain lan-
guage of section 703(i) did not support the borough's position:
The section does no more than limit the scope of Title VII, the op-
erative words being: "Nothing contained in this subchapter shall ap-
ply . . ." Section 703(i) does not require employers to implement
Native American employment preference programs. It does not state
that employers may implement such programs without regard to any
local, state, or federal law. It does not provide an incentive to give
such preferences. In summary, it does not create or authorize a pref-
150. Malabed v. N. Slope Borough, 335 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 2003).
151. "Occupying the field" means that the federal government preempts a state law because the
federal government has regulated that issue to the extent that nothing is left for the state to regulate.
See Indus. Truck Ass'n, Inc. v. Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1997).
152. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i) (2000) ("any business or enterprise on or near an Indian reser-
vation.").
153. Malabed, 335 F.3d at 871.
154. Id. at 869.
155. Id. (quoting Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987)).
156. Id. at 870.
157. "Section 1104 permits a finding of preemption only if the Alaska Constitution's Equal
Protection Clause, here prohibiting the challenged employment preferences, is inconsistent with the
purpose of Title VII or with § 703(i)." Id. at 871.
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erence program. Rather, it creates an exception to the reach of Title
VII for otherwise valid programs.158
Thus, without more, the exemption to Title VII may not provide the
requisite intent to preempt Alaska discrimination statutes that would be
required under the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal's preemption analysis
in Malabed v. North Slope.159
VI. USE OF HIRING PREFERENCES BY NATIVE CORPORATIONS
AFTER MALABED
Despite the unfavorable holdings in both the Alaska Supreme Court
and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Malabed,6 ° some hiring pref-
erences are still likely permissible for Native corporations because (1)
some types of hiring preferences offered by Native corporations clearly
do not violate the Alaska Constitution or state discrimination laws and
(2) despite Malabed, Congress has indeed indicated an intent to preempt
Alaska state law to allow some types of hiring preferences by Alaska
Native corporations.
In this Part, Section A addresses the state law issues regarding hir-
ing preferences under state law. Section B argues that hiring preferences
for shareholders and their immediate family members do not violate the
Alaska Constitution or other state laws. Section C considers preemption
under the two common types of preferences. 161 Section D then provides a
summary of permissible forms of hiring preferences in light of Malabed.
A. Hiring Preferences Offered by Native Corporations
May Be Problematic Under State Law
The holding of Malabed is not applicable to hiring preferences of-
fered by the Native corporations. The Malabed holding does not apply to
hiring preferences offered by Native corporations because (1) the Mala-
bed court limited its holding to entities of state government; (2) Mala-
bed's equal protection analysis is not applicable to Native corporations
because they are not entities of state government; and (3) such hiring
preferences do not violate the statute in question in Malabed, the Prohib-
ited Discrimination Statute,' 62 which only prohibits entities of state gov-
ernment from distinguishing between individuals based on race. Despite
158. Id. at 868 (emphasis added).
159. Id. at 874.
160. Id. at 868; Malabed v. N. Slope Borough, 70 P.3d 416, 426 (Alaska 2003)
161. "Alaska Native" and "shareholder and shareholder family" preferences are addressed
specifically because they are not only the most common types of preferences, but are also the types
of preferences outlined in federal statutory language in ANCSA. See 43 U.S.C. § 1606(r) (2000).
162. ALASKA STAT. § 29.20.630 (2002).
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Malabed's inapplicability to Native corporations, hiring preferences of-
fered by Native corporations could still be construed to run afoul of
Alaska state law.
First, the question of whether Native corporations can offer hiring
preferences is distinguishable from the holding in Malabed because
Malabed addressed the issue of whether a government entity could pro-
vide hiring preferences. 163 As discussed above, the court in Malabed lim-
ited its holding to that issue. 164 Precisely because the Malabed ruling de-
cided whether the North Slope Borough could identify any source of le-
gitimate, case-specific governmental interest in a preference favoring
Native Americans, its holding should not be expanded to apply to cases
where nongovernmental entities are involved.165 Because Native corpora-
tions are distinct from government entities, Malabed's holding does not
reach them.
Second, even without the court's limitations on its holding, Mala-
bed's equal protection analysis is not applicable to the question of hiring
preferences by Native corporations because they are unique entities cre-
ated to settle Alaska Native land claims by the federal government, not
entities of state government. 166 The state government involvement in the
administration of Native corporations is far more attenuated than the ad-
ministration of the hiring preferences by the North Slope Borough. In
contrast to the significant state action in the North Slope Borough at is-
sue in Malabed, the only state government action with respect to Native
corporations is the fact that the state refrains from enforcing the Unlaw-
ful Employment Practices Statute.167 Thus, a suit brought by a party
would be based primarily on the discrimination as evidenced by the vio-
lation of the state statutes because the Equal Protection Clause would not
directly apply.
Finally, unlike the case in Malabed, Alaska's Prohibited Discrimi-
nation Statute does not apply to hiring preferences offered by Native
corporations because the statute prohibits only Alaska's municipalities
and other political subunits from engaging in racial and national origin
discrimination.'68 The statute does not address the conduct of Alaska Na-
tive corporations or other private corporations, and cannot be read to do
so.
163. Malabed, 70 P.3d at 426-27.
164. See supra Part IV.A.
165. See supra Part IV.A.
166. See 43 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000).
167. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (2003).
168. ALASKA STAT. § 29.20.630 (2002).
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Despite the differences from the hiring preference at issue in Mala-
bed, the preferences offered by Native corporations are still problematic
because the Unlawful Employment Practices Statute' 69 may prohibit hir-
ing preferences based on "race," and Alaska courts have not yet recog-
nized the designation of Alaska Native as a political designation by the
federal government. 170
Native corporations are formed under state law and do not have the
same sovereignty over their lands owned in Alaska as Native Americans
have over reservation lands in the lower forty-eight states. Instead, Na-
tive corporations must follow Alaska state laws to the extent that federal
law has not preempted those laws. 17' Alaska has adopted statutes that
correspond with the federal Civil Rights Act. 7 2 Alaska's Unlawful Em-
ployment Practices Statute provides that "it is unlawful for an employer
to refuse employment to a person, bar a person from employment, or dis-
criminate against a person in compensation or in a term, condition, or
privilege of employment because of the person's race, religion, color, or
national origin."' 173 On its face, the statute limits the Native corporations'
ability to provide hiring preferences by preventing corporations chartered
under state law from taking race into account. Alaska has not yet recog-
nized any political relationship with Alaska Natives and has rejected the
notion that the Alaska Constitution radiates implied guardianship powers
that would allow it to treat Alaska Natives "as if they were wards.' ' 174 If
Alaska courts continue to refuse to recognize that Alaskan Native status
is a political status, then Alaska courts could conclude that the hiring
preferences for Alaska Natives are a racial designation in violation of the
Unlawful Employment Practices Statute.
Because the Alaska Constitution and Alaska courts do not recog-
nize the Alaska Native designation as political, any defendant Native
corporation that raises the argument that the designation is not racial is
likely to face significant challenges. Although terming a federal political
designation "racial" would be disingenuous, the Alaska courts seem
unlikely to recognize the political designation as anything but a racial
designation, given Alaska's substantial equal protection jurisprudence. 75
169. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(2).
170. See John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1999); In re C.R.H., 29 P.3d 849 (Alaska 2001)
(declining to recognize that Alaska Natives have a different political status than other Alaskans).
171. See CASE, supra note 26, at 251.
172. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (2003).
173. § 18.80.220(a)(1).
174. Malabed v. N. Slope Borough, 70 P.3d 416, 422 (Alaska 2003).
175. See McDowell v. Alaska, 785 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1989) (invalidating the state's implementa-
tion of subsistence regulations under the Alaska National Interest Land Conservation Act on state
constitutional grounds because the regulations treated rural and urban residents differently). Al-
though the court focused specifically on state constitutional provisions related to hunting and fishing
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The court in Malabed expressed this view. "To the extent that the Alaska
Constitution implies anything concerning the state's relations with
Alaska Natives, then, it mirrors the constitutional drafters' well-
recognized desire to treat Alaska Natives like all other Alaska citi-
zens." 17
6
On the other hand, the issue certainly has not been completely
closed by Malabed. As discussed above, the court raised the hypothetical
that if "the borough's ordinance reflects this kind of political classifica-
tion and does not discriminate on the basis of race, the ordinance might
avoid problems [with] the Alaska Constitution's bar against racial dis-
crimination.', 177 However, the court then reasoned that the "political na-
ture of the classification would not necessarily insulate the ordinance
from Malabed's equal protection challenge."' 178 This was because the
borough, unlike the Bureau of Indian Affairs in Morton v. Mancari,
179
had no obvious governmental interest in furthering Native American
self-government and Native Americans have no "unique legal status"
under borough law.' 80 This reasoning, however, does not hold true for the
Native corporations, for although incorporated under state laws, Native
corporations are an entirely federal creation and the Alaska Natives will
retain all stock as inalienable for the foreseeable future. 18' Thus, Alaska
Natives, at least as shareholders, do have a "unique legal status" through
the corporations. 18 Moreover, unlike boroughs or other instruments of
Alaska state government, Native corporations have been charged with
the task of furthering the interests of Alaska Natives.
8 3
B. Hiring Preferences for Shareholders and Their Family Members Do
Not Violate the Alaska Constitution or State Laws
Although Alaska's statutes and administrative rulings disfavor the
use of hiring preferences,' 84 hiring preferences for the Native corporation
rights, McDowell still stands for the proposition that Alaska's courts are inclined to treat all Alaska
citizens similarly.
176. Malabed, 70 P.3d at 422 ("We consider the Eskimo and the Indian a citizen just the same
as all the rest of us. We don't consider that he is any better than we are, and we don't consider that
he is any worse. He is a man just like we are; and he is entitled to all the rights and privileges and all
the duties of citizenship, just as we are." (quoting Delegate Davis) See 4 Proceedings of Alaska
Constitutional Convention 2525, 2527-91 (Jan. 18, 1956)).
177. Malabed, 70 P.3d at 420.
178. 1d.
179. See supra Parts 1lI.B, IV.A.
180. Malabed, 70 P.3d at 420.
181. See supra Part Ill.
182. See 43 U.S.C. § 1606(r) (2000).
183. § 1601.
184. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(2)(a)(1) (2003); see Alaska State Comm'n for Human
Rights, ASCHR No. C87-105, 10 (1993).
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shareholders and their close family do not violate the Alaska Constitu-
tion's Equal Rights Clause or state discrimination statutes because, as
discussed above, (1) the Malabed decision was limited to its facts, 85 (2)
neither the Prohibited Discrimination Statute nor the Unlawful Employ-
ment Practices Statute apply to shareholder preferences, and (3) adjudi-
cation by the Alaska Human Rights Commission has held that the use of
hiring preferences for shareholders would likely be permissible.
First, as discussed above, the Malabed holding is limited to its
facts.186 Also, in applying Malabed, the state recognition of a hiring pref-
erence for shareholders and their families would not require recognizing
Alaska Natives as a political classification. Thus, there is no trigger for
an equal rights violation under the Alaska Constitution.
Second, although Alaska statutes may apply to an Alaska Native
preference, the statutes do not apply to shareholder and shareholder fam-
ily preferences. As discussed above, Alaska does not recognize any for-
mal trust relationship with Alaskan Native tribes and, therefore, does not
have the same sort of political relationship with Alaska Natives as the
federal government has. 187 The Malabed court premised its decision on
the notion that if there is no political status, then the hiring preferences
are based on race. 188 Shareholder status, however, cannot be so easily
dismissed as a racial designation because shareholder status is based on
the property right of stock ownership in a Native corporation.1 89
Third, the Alaska Human Rights Commission (the "Commission"),
an adjudicatory body that can impose penalties for employment viola-
tions, has interpreted the ANCSA amendment to the Civil Rights Act to
preempt the Prohibited Discrimination Statute only insofar as it would
prohibit a Native corporation from offering shareholder hiring prefer-
ences. 19° In an advisory determination, the Commission indicated that
Native corporations must abide by Alaska's employment discrimination
laws, even though the exemption from federal law would allow Native
corporations to discriminate in their hiring practices. 191 The enforcement
185. See supra section IV(A).
186. See supra section IV(A).
187. Malabed, 70 P.3d at 422 (rejecting the notion that the Alaska Constitution radiates im-
plied guardianship powers that would allow the state or its boroughs to treat Alaska Natives as if
they were wards); see supra Part IV.A.
188. See generally Malabed, 70 P.3d at 420-24.
189. See 43 U.S.C. § 1606(g) (2000).
190. Alaska State Comm 'nfor Human Rights, ASCHR No. C87-105, 31.
191. See id at 18-19. "With the single exception of preferential treatment of shareholders, there
does not appear to be any rational connection between discrimination by an ANCSA corporation on
these bases and the economic well being of the corporation or of Native Americans." Id. However, it
should be noted that in Alaska State Commission for Human Rights v. Eyak Village, the issue before
the Alaska Human Rights Commission was whether gender discrimination claims could be brought
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of state statutes would probably not be preempted by Title VII under the
Malabed analysis. But if the Native corporations are providing hiring
based on shareholder and shareholder family member status, the prefer-
ences are based not on race or national origin, but on shareholder status.
The Commission has noted that allowing Native corporations to
prefer shareholders in hiring would probably be an acceptable practice
because "it is a legitimate federal goal to strengthen the Native segment
of the Alaskan Economy, by permitting a shareholder hire preference for
ANCSA corporations."' 192 This assertion has never been tested in court; it
does, however, have a "practical force, because to test it would likely
require protracted litigation."' 93 If the Commission allows benefits to
shareholders, corporations should also be able to extend benefits to
shareholders' family members because the preference would still be
based on a corporate shareholder relationship, not a racial relationship.
Even if the Commission or an Alaska court were to determine that an
extension of the shareholder benefit was based on a racial or other disfa-
vored status, federal law would likely preempt state law on the matter.
C. Federal Law Would Preempt Some Violations ofAlaska State Law
That Result from Hiring Preferences
The conflicts between state laws and tribal governments have pro-
duced a substantial body of preemption law. If tribal self-government or
the exercise of a particular power is guaranteed by a federal treaty, stat-
ute, or executive order, enforcement of state law is superseded. 94 "In
determining whether a federal statute preempts state law, 'our sole task is
to ascertain the intent of Congress."",195 The Malabed court started with
the presumption that Congress did not intend to preempt state law.' 96 The
Malabed court thus used a stricter theory of preemption than is generally
used for "Indians in Indian Country."' 19 7 Despite this strict standard and
against a Native corporation. Id. at 4. Thus, such broad conclusions regarding "discrimination" by
the Commission may not only be unwarranted, but also dicta on the question of whether Native
corporations can offer a broader hiring preference for all Alaska Natives..
192. Alaska State Comm 'nfor Human Rights, ASCHR No. C87-105, 30 (1993).
193. CASE, supra note 26, at 251.
194. MeClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 173 (1973); CASE, supra note 26,
at 374.
195. Malabed v. N. Slope Borough, 335 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Cal. Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass 'n, 479 U.S. at 280).
196. Malabed, 335 F.3d at 869.
197. See Blunk v. Ariz. Dep't of Transp., 177 F.3d 879, 882 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Ketchi-
kan Gateway Borough v. Ketchikan Indian Corp., 75 P.3d 1042, 1046-48 (Alaska 2003) (noting that
"notwithstanding the [usual] rule of strict construction [for federal preemption], where the question
is whether federal law requires the exemption of tribal interests from taxation, ambiguities in federal
law should be resolved in favor of the tribe.").
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the Venetie ruling that ANCSA lands are not Indian country, the standard
is met by the fact that Congress has shown the intent to preempt state
laws in order to allow Native corporations to provide hiring preferences.
Like the provision at issue in Malabed,198 the Civil Rights Act ex-
emption to ANCSA not only authorizes Native corporations to discrimi-
nate in favor of their shareholders, but also completely exempts Native
corporations from complying with the equal employment provisions of
the Civil Rights Act. Native corporations could engage in overt discrimi-
nation on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin without run-
ning afoul of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.1 99 If courts followed the
same preemption standard used in Malabed, as courts may after the Ve-
netie decision,200 then the Civil Rights Act exemption could suffer the
same treatment as the federal statutory scheme at issue in Malabed. The
courts could treat the section as precatory and use the reasoning of the
Malabed court, that the exemption "does not state that employers may
implement such programs without regard to any local, state, or federal
law.",20 1 However, despite the similar language of the exemption, the in-
tent of Congress to provide preferential hiring is much clearer for Native
corporations because Congress expressly allowed Native corporations to
use hiring preferences.20 2
Whereas the Native corporations are private entities with unique
federal protections, the North Slope Borough in Malabed was an entity
of the Alaska state government. 20 3 The legislative history of the 1988
amendments to ANCSA that brought regional corporations within the
Civil Rights Act exemption indicates that the very purpose of the exemp-
tion was to authorize shareholder employment programs. 204 Standing
alone, the exemption may not provide the strict preemption standard es-
poused in Malabed. However, section 1606(r) of ANCSA offers addi-
tional support for the notion that Congress intended to allow Native cor-
198. Section 703(i) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i) (1994)),
excludes Native American employers "on or near Indian reservations" from the equal employment
provisions of the Civil Rights Act. Malabed v. N. Slope Borough, 70 P.3d 416, 424 (Alaska 2003).
199. CASE, supra note 26, at 250.
200. In Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520, 531 (1998), the Supreme Court held
that ANCSA lands were not "Indian Country" for the purposes of sovereignty. However, the Court
indicated that allotments held by Alaska Natives may be Indian country. Id. The Indian country
status of Alaska Native township sites also remains undecided. Id.
201. Malabed, 335 F.3d at 867, 871.
202. See 43 U.S.C. § 1626(g) (2000).
203. Malabed, 335 F.3d at 866.
204. See S. REP. No. 100-201 at 26 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3269, 3290 (stat-
ing that the purpose of the exemption was to "facilitate Alaska Native shareholder employment
programs by resolving any uncertainty as to the applicability of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to cer-
tain business enterprises in which Native corporations participate.").
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porations to provide hiring preferences and to preempt state law that may
prevent Native corporations from offering these preferences to share-
holders and to individuals closely related to shareholders. 20 5
Section 1606(r) expressly allows Native corporations to provide
benefits for shareholders or immediate families, 20 6 but little explanatory
legislative history accompanied this particular addition, which was
passed within a much larger set of amendments. 20 7 Employment prefer-
ences fall into the category of an appropriate benefit to be provided by
Native corporations. 2° Although the benefits are not clearly defined, the
clear intent of Congress to allow hiring preferences in the Civil Rights
Act exemption indicates that a hiring preference should be considered an
intended benefit for shareholders and their families. 20 9 Even if a court
could read the terms "benefits" and "welfare" narrowly, the fact that
Congress exempted the Native corporations from the discrimination stat-
utes and gave corporations instead of land means that Congress intended
the Native corporations to be able to benefit their own people through
these hiring preferences.
The terms "benefit" and "welfare" are not defined in this statute,
but should be read to include hiring preferences as an intended benefit
for shareholders. First, the term itself, "benefit," is limited only to the
extent that the benefits must have the purpose of promoting the health,
education, or welfare of such shareholders or family members.2 10 The
typical rule of construction in federal Indian law is that an ambiguous
expression must be resolved in favor of the Indian parties concerned z. 1
Thus, if federal courts were to apply this rule, the term "benefit" should
be interpreted in favor of the Alaska Natives asserting the benefits. Sec-
ond, "welfare" is a catchall phrase that could be used to cover a number
of programs, so long as the programs have the purpose of providing
benefits to shareholders and shareholders' families.
205. See § 1606(r) (2000).
206. Section 1606(r) provides:
The authority of a Native Corporation to provide benefits to its shareholders who are Na-
tives or descendants of Natives or to its shareholders' immediate family members who
are Natives or descendants of Natives to promote the health, education, or welfare of such
shareholders or family members is expressly authorized and confirmed. Eligibility for
such benefits need not be based on share ownership in the Native Corporation and such
benefits may be provided on a basis other than pro rata based on share ownership.
207. See ANCSA Land Bank Protection Act, HR 2000, 105th Cong. (1998) (enacted).
208. Id.
209. See § 1626(g).
210. See § 1606(r).
211. See McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); Carpenter v.
Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930); Winters v. U.S, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908).
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In the long term, Congress should consider future amendments that
define the term "benefits" and "welfare" as used in § 1606(r) of ANCSA.
In its current form, an unfriendly court or state administrative body could
read § 1606(r) to be narrowly diminishing the intent of Congress to allow
shareholder and shareholder-family hiring preferences. Despite these
concerns, Congress has made clear its intent to encourage hiring prefer-
ences.
Notwithstanding the definitional questions at issue, § 1606(r)
clearly preempts Alaska state law. Moreover, § 1606(p) expressly pro-
vides that "in the event of any conflict between the provisions of this sec-
tion and the laws of the State of Alaska, the provisions of this section
shall prevail. 21 2 Because the "sole task is to ascertain the intent of Con-
gress" when determining whether a federal statute preempts state law, §
1606(r) clearly preempts state law and allows Native corporations to
provide such benefits for its shareholders. This express statement even
meets the stringent standard set forth under Malabed.213
D. Permissible Forms ofAlaska Native Hiring
Preferences Under State Law
Based on the decision by the Alaska Civil Rights Commission, 2 4
even without preemption of Alaska state law, shareholder and share-
holder-family preferences would likely be permissible under current
Alaska state law. Although Alaska state law may limit the ability of Na-
tive corporations to have broad hiring preferences that state officials
would attribute to race, Alaska state law would likely allow hiring pref-
erences more closely tailored to the purpose of hiring Native corporation
shareholders and their close family members. Shareholders are not des-
ignated by race; rather, they are holders of the stock of the Native corpo-
ration. Based on this designation, a hiring preference could be upheld
based on the shareholder relationship to the Native corporation, instead
of dismissed as based on race.215 Likewise, a shareholder preference that
also includes close family members is likely to withstand the Alaska dis-
crimination statutes because it also would not be based on a racial desig-
nation.
A broad shareholder preference that would allow shareholders from
any Native corporation or their close family members to enjoy a hiring
preference from any other Native corporation-a sort of reciprocity
212. § 1606(p).
213. Malabed v. N. Slope Borough, 335 F.3d 864, 868-69 (9th Cir. 2003).
214. Alaska State Comm 'nfor Human Rights, ASCHR No. C87-105, 18-19, 31 (1993).
215. As discussed above, the state of Alaska may consider an Alaska Native designation a
racial designation. See supra Part V.A.
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among the Native corporations that would allow more mobility-might
be more problematic. Although it may follow logically that the Native
corporations would offer these cross-corporation hiring preferences
based on non-racial designations, in reality the right would essentially
extend to almost any Alaska Native. A court decision resulting from liti-
gation on this issue would likely hinge on how a court decides to frame
the hiring preference: whether the court considers reciprocal recognition
of shareholder status as a preference for shareholders and their immedi-
ate families or as a disguised Alaska Native preference.
Like broad shareholder preferences, general Alaska Native prefer-
ences would also be more problematic than shareholder preferences
without a finding that the Civil Rights Act exemption216 preempts the
Alaska discrimination statutes. If the Alaska courts consider an Alaska
Native preference to be a racial preference, the Native corporations
would have nothing other than the political status of Alaska Natives on
which they could base their preferences. Because Alaska has not yet rec-
ognized any political status in Alaska Natives,21 7 the Native corporations
may only be able to satisfy the lesser showing required to use share-
holder and shareholder-family hiring preferences.
On the other hand, because Alaska court decisions have not ex-
pressly forbidden the recognition of a political classification, the question
remains open to litigation. The issue of whether a hiring preference for
Alaska Natives is allowed is likely to be a mixed question of Alaska state
law and federal preemption. A procedural situation similar to Malabed
may arise where a federal court certifies the question to the Alaska Su-
preme Court and then rules on the preemption issue. Assuming that
Alaska courts do not recognize a political classification of Alaska Na-
tives, whether federal courts read the ANCSA provisions to have the
congressional intent to preempt state law and allow hiring preferences for
Alaska Natives is likely to determine whether Native corporations can
offer the broader "Alaska Native" hiring preference. Consequently, the
preferences least likely to be permissible are general "Native American"
hiring preferences. This is because the Alaska courts would likely con-
sider the "Native American" designation a racial designation and because
congressional intent does not indicate that Congress recognizes an inter-
est in allowing Native corporations to use broad "Native American"
preferences. 2 18
216. § 1626(g) provides the exclusion from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
217. Malabed v. N. Slope Borough, 70 P.3d 416, 422 (Alaska 2003). ("We reject at the outset
the notion that the Alaska Constitution radiates implied guardianship powers allowing the state or its
boroughs to treat Alaska Natives as if they were wards.").
218. See § 1606(g).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Alaska courts are unlikely to find that the Native corporations
employing a "shareholder and their immediate family" hiring preference
violate state law because it is not a preference based on race. In addition,
given the federal government's unique relationship with Native corpora-
tions and the clear intent of Congress for Native corporations to be able
to provide shareholders and their immediate families with employment
preferences, even if the Alaska courts were to find that hiring preferences
for shareholders and close family violated the applicable state statutes,
federal law would likely preempt Alaska state law and allow the use of
shareholder and shareholder-family hiring preferences.
However, unlike shareholder preferences, broader hiring prefer-
ences, such as a hiring preference for "Alaska Natives" would likely be
found to violate state law in the same manner as the provision at issue in
Malabed. The language of the Civil Rights Act exemption would likely
be considered precatory, as opposed to preemptory. Moreover, Alaska
has not recognized the unique political status of Alaska Natives as
Alaska Native "tribes" by the Secretary of the Interior. Because preemp-
tion is unlikely without more specific preemptory language from Con-
gress, broad hiring preferences for Alaska Natives would likely be con-
sidered to violate Alaska Statutes Unlawful Employment Practices Stat-
ute without state courts recognizing the federal political status of Alaska
Natives.
To buttress its clear intent of encouraging hiring preferences pro-
vided by the Civil Rights Act exemption, Congress should consider
amending ANCSA to define the terms "benefits" and "welfare" as the
used in section 1606(r) to specifically include hiring preferences for Na-
tive corporations. Congress should also consider amending section
1606(r) to include "Alaska Natives" as the group to which Native corpo-
rations may provide benefits, as opposed to the group of "shareholders
who are Natives or descendents of Natives or its shareholders' immediate
family members who are Natives or descendents of Natives., 2 19 By doing
so, Congress would protect its clear intention of providing hiring prefer-
ences for Alaska Natives, as a federally recognized political class, with
sufficiently preemptory language to prevent courts from reading preemp-
tion out of Congress's intent. However, even without any additional
amendments by Congress, if properly tailored, Native corporations may
continue to use hiring preferences to meet the needs of their shareholders
and those closely related to them, including spouses and descendents.
219. § 1606(r).
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